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Reuscher: McMullen v. Ohio State University Hospitals

MC MULLEN V . OHIO STATE UNIVERSITY HOSPITALS: THIS ISN’T VEGAS, BUT DON’T TELL THE
COURTS – PLAYING WITH PERCENTAGES AND THE LOSS-OF-CHANCE DOCTRINE
“The burning candle of life is such a precious thing in anyone’s existence that no one has
the right to extinguish it before it flickers out into perpetual darkness and oblivion.”1
I. INTRODUCTION

People place an enormous amount of trust, not to mention their own lives, in the “hands”
of our medical practitioners. In today’s society, modern technology has allowed doctors to
possess “god- like” powers. In fact, doctors may play the most vital role in maintaining the future
of our society. However, no doctor is infallible. Imagine, as unfortunate as it may be, that a
loved one requires immediate medical care. During this treatment, the doctor, or someone within
the immediate supervision of the doctor, incorrectly performs a portion of the procedure and
directly causes the death of the patient.
Is it fair for the courts to limit the amount of damages recoverable by a grieving survivor
because the doctor only eliminated a chance of survival? Should the doctor be able to argue that
he should be responsible for only a minimal amount of damages, even though he was the direct
cause of death? Unfortunately, these problematic, emotional, and monetary issues faced the
justices of the McMullen Court.
Part II of this note presents a background on the history of, and alternative theories to, the
loss-of-chance doctrine. Part III presents the facts, procedural history, holding, and reasoning of
the case. Part IV scrutinizes and assesses the court’s holding, the various public policy
implications, and the future effect on medical malpractice claims. Finally, Part V concludes the

1

Valdez v. Lyman-Roberts Hosp., Inc., 638 S.W.2d 111, 116 (Tex. Ct. App. 1982).
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paper. Essentially, the question is whether the loss-of-chance doctrine will apply when a
plaintiff proves a direct causal connection between the injury and the defendant’s negligent act. 2

II. BACKGROUND
A. Medical Malpractice
1. Origin of Claim
Today’s medical malpractice claim is an extension of the common- law negligence
action. 3 This new basis for liability arose during the Industrial Revolution and was most likely
premised upon the increasing number of injuries caused by industrial machinery. 4 The case of
Cross v. Guthery5 is the origin of medical malpractice in the United States. 6 Under common- law
negligence principles, a plaintiff must prove four elements in order to prevail upon the claim. 7

2

McMullen v. Ohio State Univ. Hosp., 725 N.E.2d 1117, 1121 (Ohio 2000).

3

Weimer v. Hetrick, 525 A.2d 643, 651 (Md. 1987). Negligence was merely a way of committing another tort and
had no independent legal significance. See also W. PAGE KEETON ET AL., PROSSER AND KEETON ON THE LAW OF
TORTS § 28, at 160 (5th ed. 1984); Percy H. Winfield, The History of Negligence in the Law of Torts 42 L.Q. RE V.
184, 184 (1926) (stating that there was very little evidence of liability attaching to negligence in the Royal Courts).
The earliest appearance of what would be considered negligence today involved those professed to be “skilled” in
public callings. Id. at 186. These public callings included the professions of a carrier, innkeeper, blacksmith,
surgeon, and an attorney. Id. Liability was placed upon these persons based upon a custom that no loss must ever
occur pro defectu custodiae of the goods. Id.
4

Winfield, supra note 3, at 195. Winfield states that early railway trains were not known for their speed or their
safety. Id. Trains were responsible for the killing of anything from a Minister of State to a cow. Id.
5

Cross v. Guthery, 2 Root 90 (Conn. Super. Ct. 1794).

6

The plaintiff’s wife had a scrofulous humor on her breast, which required surgery. Id. The “skilled doctor” cut off
the plaintiff wife’s breast in a manner that caused her to be in severe pain for three hours at which time she passed
away. Id. The court found the doctor cut off the patient’s breast in the most “unskillful and cruel” manner, contrary
to known rules and practices. Id. The court held that the defendant had wholly broken and violated his promise to
the plaintiff to perform surgery on his wife in a manner of the utmost safety and skill. Id. See also Allan H.
McCoid, The Care Required of Medical Practitioners, 12 VAND. L. REV. 549, 550 (1959) (stating that medical
malpractice for doctors was indeed born with Cross).
7

KEETON ET AL., supra note 3, § 30, at 164-65. These elements include: (1) the defendant owed the plaintiff a
recognized duty under the law, (2) the defendant breached his duty to the plaintiff, (3) the defendant’s breach was
the legal cause in fact and the proximate cause of the injury, and (4) the plaintiff suffered an actual injury. Id. See
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The plaintiff must establish a duty of care by showing that some special relationship
exists between the defendant and the injured plaintiff. 8 The courts have held that such a duty
exists between a physician and a patient. 9 There is a breach of this duty when a physician fails to
conform to the required standard of conduct, which is based upon an objective reasonable
person. 10
Proximate cause continues to be the most difficult element for an aggrieved plaintiff to
satisfy. 11 The courts divide causation into two separate issues: cause- in-fact and proximate

also Patrick L. Evatt, Note, A Closer Look at Loss of Chance Under Nebraska Medical Malpractice Law: Steineke
v. Share Health Plan, Inc., 246 Neb. 374, 518 N.W.2d 904 (1994), 76 NEB. L. REV. 979, 981 (1997); Frank J. Cavico
& Nancy M. Cavico, The Nursing Profession in the 1990’s: Negligence and Malpractice Liability, 43 CLEV. ST . L.
REV. 557, 560 (1995).
8

Cavico & Cavico, supra note 7, at 561.

9

McKinney v. Schlatter, 692 N.E.2d 1045, 1047-48 (Ohio Ct. App. 1997). The court held that a “physician-patient”
relationship arises out of a consensual contract of employment, express or imp lied, under which the patient seeks
medical assistance and the physician aggress to render treatment.
10

KEETON ET AL., supra note 3, § 30, at 164. Fossett v. Board of Regents of Univ. of Neb., 605 N.W.2d 465, 468
(Neb. 2000) (establishing a breach of this duty requires the admittance of expert testimony). However, it is not
necessary for expert testimony to be presented when circumstances are such that the recognition of the alleged
negligence is within the contemplation of laymen. Id. The most common situation is when the doctor or someone
under his control leaves a foreign object inside the body of the patient. Id. at 468-69. See especially A.P. HERBERT ,
M ISLEADING CASES IN THE COMMON LAW 12-13 (1930). The author states:
He is an ideal, a standard, the embodiment of all those qualities, which we demand of the good
citizen . . . He is one who invariably looks where he is going, and is careful to examine the
immediate foreground before he executes a leap or a bounds who neither star-gazes not is lost in
mediation when approaching trapdoors or the margin of a dock . . . who never swears, gambles or
loses his temper, who uses nothing except in moderation, and even while he flogs his child is
mediating only on the golden mean.
Id. See also Ronald K.L. Collins, Language, History and the Legal Process: A Profile of the Reasonable Man, 8
RUT .-CAM. L. J. 311, 318-19 (Cavico 1977) (arguing that there is no mention of women, and women certainly are
rational people). See generally Cavico, supra note 7, at 563-64 (stating that the standard that the courts apply is a
bare minimum and if a person has knowledge, skill and intelligence superior to that of an ordinary layperson the law
requires the person to act accordingly); McCoid, supra note 6, at 558 (noting that the standard of care is one that is
“commonly exercised and possessed by reasonable physicians . . . in same or similar cases”). Also, this standard has
been around for thousands of years starting with the Oath of Hippocrates which states: “I swear by Apollo . . . that
according to my judgment and ability . . . I will give no deadly medicine to anyone if asked . . . and will abstain from
. . . mischief and corruption.” Id. at 549. The question is whether the defendant acted as a reasonably prudent
person would have in the same or similar circumstances.
11

KEETON ET AL., supra note 3, § 41, at 263. The authors agreed that there is nothing located within the profession
of law that causes more confusion among the practitioners. Id. However, no other alternative has proven workable.
Id.
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cause. 12 The plaintiff’s burden of proof requires him or her to introduce evidence in order to
show that it is more likely that the conduct of the defendant was the cause- in-fact of the injurious
result. 13
The second part of the causation analysis is proximate, or “legal,” causation. 14 An injury
is proximately caused by an act when that act played a substantial part in bringing about the
harm, and when the injury was either a direct result or a reasonably probable consequence of an
act. 15 A determination of what constitutes proximate cause involves notions of philosophy,
public policy, convenience, and justice to the parties. 16
2. Ohio’s Medical Malpractice Law
In order to maintain a medical malpractice

17

action, based upon either a wrongful death

or a survivorship action statute, 18 the plaintiff must prove several elements. These elements

12

Jennifer P. Keller, Torts -- Medical Malpractice -- Loss of Chance Not a Cognizable Cause of Action in
Tennessee; Kilpatrick v. Bryant, 868 S.W.2d 594 (Tenn. 1993), 62 TENN. L. REV. 375, 375 (1995); Wex S. Malone,
Ruminations on Cause-In–Fact, 9 STAN . L. REV. 60, 60 (1956). Compare David W. Robertson, The Common Sense
of Cause in Fact, 75 TEX. L. REV. 1765, 1769-73 (1997) (giving a five step analysis on how to approach a but-for
question), with Guido Calabresi, Concerning Cause and the Law of Torts: An Essay for Harry Kalven, Jr., 43 U.
CHI. L. REV. 69, 85 (1975) (arguing that the but for test is “virtually universal”). See also KEETON ET AL ., supra
note 3, § 41, at 266 (saying that the defendant’s actions are not a cause of the event if the event would have occurred
without it).
13

KEETON ET AL., supra note 3, § 41, at 269. The preponderance of the evidence standard prevents a party from
showing only a mere possibility of causation, or one of pure speculation. Id. However, the plaintiff is not required
to prove his case beyond a reasonable doubt. Id. It is enough to introduce evidence that would allow reasonable
people to conclude it was more probable that the defendant caused the result than it was not. Id.
14

Id. at 273. The question is whether the defendant should be held legally responsible for his actions. Id. The term
“proximate cause” means little more than “immediate.” Id.
15

Keller, supra note 12, at 376. Courts have found that the act need not be the only cause, nor must it be the last or
nearest cause. See, e.g., McDonnell v. McPartlin, 736 N.E.2d 1074, 1083 (Ill. 2000), aff’g 708 N.E.2d 412 (Ill. App.
Ct. 1999).
16

Palsgraf v. Long Island R. Co., 162 N.E. 99, 103 (N.Y. 1928) (Andrews, J., dissenting). Any philosophical
doctrine of causation does not help. Id. Justice Andrews stated that any action has an eternal effect. Id. However,
this effect will be altered by other causes. Id. Each one will have some effect on the result. Id. The act has
changed history forever and placing liability upon such remote acts will do nothing but increase litigation
significantly. Id. See also KEETON ET AL ., supra note 3, § 42 at 273.
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include: (1) the existence of a duty owed to the plaintiff’s or the plaintiff’s decedent; (2) a breach
of that duty; (3) proximate cause between the breach and injury; and (4) injury to the plaintiff. 19
B. Loss-of-chance Doctrine 20

17

Cramer v. Price, 82 N.E.2d 874, 874 (Ohio Ct. App. 1948) (defining medical malpractice as negligent and
unlawful willful acts committed by a physician in treating his patient by which patient’s death or injury occurs).
18

The Ohio Revised Code provides:
(a)(1) When the death of a person is caused by a wrongful act, neglect, or default which would
have entitled the party injured to maintain an action and recover damages if death had not ensued,
the person who would have be liable if death had not occurred . . . shall be liable for damages,
notwithstanding the death of the person injured.
OHIO REV. CODE A NN. § 2125.01 (West 2000). Additionally, § 2305.21 provides:
In addition to the causes of action that survived at common law, causes of actions for mesne
profits, or injuries to the person or property, or for deceit or fraud, also shall survive and such
actions may be brought notwithstanding the death of the person entitled or liable thereto.
OHIO REV. CODE A NN. § 2305.21 (West 2000).
19

Littleton v. Good Samaritan Hosp. & Health Ctr., 529 N.E.2d 449, 454 (Ohio 1988). See also Wheeler v. Wise,
729 N.E. 2d 413, 415 (Ohio Ct. App. 1999), appeal denied, 716 N.E.2d 723 (Ohio 1999); Hubbard v. Laurelwood
Hosp., 620 N.E.2d 895, 899 (Ohio Ct. App. 1993); Wells v. Miami Valley Hosp., 631 N.E.2d 642, 648 (Ohio Ct.
App. 1993); Paul v. MetroHealth St. Luke’s Hosp., No. 71195, 1998 WL 742173, at *5 (Ohio Ct. App. Oct. 22,
1998); Ulmer v. Ackerman, 621 N.E.2d 1315 (Ohio Ct. App. 1993); Avondet v. Blankstein, 692 N.E.2d 1063 (Ohio
Ct. App. 1993). See generally Menifee v. Ohio Welding Prods. Inc., 472 N.E.2d 707, 710 (Ohio 1984) (holding that
duty is based upon the foreseeability of the injury); Randall v. Mihm, 616 N.E.2d 1171, 1174 (Ohio Ct. App. 1992)
(holding that proximate cause is defined in Ohio as a happening or event, which as a natural and continuous
sequence produces an injury without which the result would not have occurred), Mannion v. Sandel, No. CA.19433,
2000 WL 327224, at *4 (Ohio Ct. App. Mar. 29, 2000) (establishing causation through medical expert testimony in
terms of probability, that is, “more probable than not”). Several other jurisdictions have adopted the same
requirements as the common law, just as Ohio has done. See generally Mitchell v. United States, 141 F.3d 8 (1st
Cir. 1998); Zuchowicz v. United States, 140 F.3d 381(2nd Cir. 1998); Deasy v. United States, 99 F.3d 354 (10th Cir.
1996); Vance v. United States, 90 F.3d 1145 (6th Cir. 1996); In re Sealed Case, 67 F.3d 965 (D.C. Cir. 1995);
Boody v. United States, 706 F.Supp 1458 (D. Kan. 1989); Zehr v. Haugen, 871 P.2d 1006 (Or. 1994); Kaiser- Bauer
v. Mullan, 609 N.W.2d 905 (Minn. Ct. App. 2000).
20

Jim M. Perdue, Recovery for Loss of Chance of Survival: When the Doctor Gambles, Who Puts Up the Stakes?, 28
S. TEX. L. REV. 37, 37 (1987). The phrases “loss of chance,” “lost chance,” and “loss of a chance” all refer to the
same theory. Throughout the years, the loss of chance doctrine has expanded to include cases that do not involve a
claim of negligent diagnosis or one of medical malpractice. Wendland v. Sparks, 574 N.W.2d 327, 332 (Iowa
1998). A general example of a loss-of-chance case is when a doctor’s conduct causes a patient to lose a chance of
recovering or avoiding some injury or disease. Margaret T. Mangan, The Loss of Chance Doctrine: A Small Price to
Pay for Human Life , 42 S.D. L. RE V. 279, 280 (1997). See also Darrell L. Keith, Loss of Chance: A Modern
Proportional Approach Theory to Damages in Texas, 44 BAYLOR L. REV. 759, 760 (1992); Lori R. Ellis, Loss of
Chance as Technique: Toeing the Line at Fifty Percent, 72 TEX. L. REV. 369, 369 (1993) (stating that loss-of-chance
cases usually involve the negligent misdiagnosis of a patient, who had less than a 51-percent chance of survival).
The court places the emphasis, not on the actual death of the patient, but upon the idea that the injury is the
diminished opportunity for a better result. Wayne Barnes, Texas Bucks the Trend- No Cause of Action for Lost
Chance of Survival in the Medical Malpractice Context: Kramer v. Lewisville Memorial Hospital, 858 S.W.2d 397
(Tex. 1993), 25 TEX. TECH. L. REV. 219, 220 (1993). Several courts and commentators have stated that the loss-ofchance doctrine is not the normally-applied rule, but as an exception where there is a negative showing of proximate
cause. Perdue, supra, at 60; Carrington v. Cleveland Bd. of Educ., No. 74624, 1999 WL 1129072, at *6 (Ohio Ct.
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1. Background of the Doctrine
Many courts and commentators have stated numerous reasons for the development of the
loss-of-chance doctrine. First, it is difficult to prove the requisite standard of causation needed in
medical malpractice claims. 21 Second, there is a patent inequality in denying a plaintiff recovery
for injuries when the negligence of a physician has reduced the patient’s chance of recovery. 22
Finally, allowing a doctor to escape liability will promote sloppiness and carelessness when
doctors are treating patients who have less than an even chance of survival. 23
The exact point of creation for the loss-of-chance doctrine remains a topic of significant
debate. Several courts rely upon Hicks v. United States.24 However, the Hicks Court endorsed

App. Dec. 9, 1999). In Roberts v. Ohio Permanente Med. Group, Inc., the Ohio Supreme Court recognized that the
loss-of-chance exception to the strict standard that the plaintiff must satisfy in order to prove causation in medical
malpractice actions. The court went on to state, with emphasis, that Roberts did not alter the common law principles
in areas of tort law. Id. See also Todd S. Aagaard, Identifying And Valuing The Injury In Lost Chance Cases, 96
M ICH. L. REV. 1335, 1335 (1998); Ellis, supra, at 372 (arguing that it is inappropriate to use this theory to limit the
plaintiff’s damages when that party can show by a preponderance of the evidence that the defendant caused the
injury).
21

Shively v. Klein, 551 A.2d 41, 43 (Del. 1988). See also Keith, supra note 20, at 760. A plaintiff must show by a
reasonable medical probability that the actions performed by the defendant proximately caused the patient’s
resulting injury. Id. at 761. The circumstances proved must lead to the conclusions with reasonable certainty and
probability. Id.
22

Shively, 551 A.2d at 43.

23

Kramer v. Lewisville Mem’l Hosp., 858 S.W.2d 397, 409 (Tex. 1993) (Hightower, J., dissenting). Justice
Hightower noted four reasons why courts should apply the loss-of-chance theory: (1) The adoption of the loss-ofchance doctrine will not lead to any wholesale changes in the law; (2) the harm to be redressed is the lost chance of
survival, not the ultimate death of the patient; (3) the all-or-nothing approach undermines the deterrence of loss
allocation functions of tort law; and (4) the all-o r-nothing approach is contrary to the concept that a chance of a
future benefit is a legally compensable interest. Id.
24

Hicks v. United States, 368 F.2d 626 (4th Cir. 1966). The decedent complained about abdominal pain and went to
the dispensary of the United States Naval Base. Id. at 628. The physician diagnosed her pain as gastroenteritis and
released her after prescribing some medicine. Id. Decedent went home, began to vomit and fell into an unconscious
state. Id. at 629. She was taken to the dispensary but was dead upon arrival. Id. The district court dismissed the
action because there was no evidence to show the defendant was negligent. Id. at 628. However, the Fourth Circuit
found that the doctor breached his duty of care. Id. at 630. The court held that the law does not require the plaintiff
to “show a certainty that the patient would have lived had she been hospitalized and operated on promptly.” Id. at
632. See also Patricia L. Andel, Medical Malpractice: The Right to Recover for the Loss of a Chance of Survival,
12 PEPP . L. REV. 973, 987 (1985).
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the doctrine only in dicta. 25 Other courts rely heavily upon Kallenberg v. Beth Israel Hospital. 26
Further, some courts look to the decision in Hamil v. Bashline. 27 Finally, the Court in Herskovits
v. Group Health Cooperative of Puget Sound28 expressly authorized the use of the doctrine in
cases in which the patient had less than an even chance of survival. 29
2. Approaches to the Loss-of-chance Doctrine
a. Traditional, “All-or- nothing” Approach30
Several courts adhere to the traditional, “a ll-or- nothing” approach, which is parallel to
traditional tort law requirements. 31 Under this approach, a plaintiff must prove that the

25

Joseph H. King, Jr., Causation, Valuation, and Chance in Personal Injury Torts Involving Preexisting Conditions
and Future Consequences, 90 YALE L.J. 1353, 1368 n.53 (1981).
26

Kallenberg v. Beth Israel Hosp., 357 N.Y.S.2d 508 (N.Y. App. Div. 1974), aff’d 337 N.E.2d 128 (N.Y. 1975).
The patient’s family brought a wrongful death action based upon negligence and medical malpractice because,
according to medical experts, the decedent would have had a 20- to 40-percent chance of survival. Id. at 510. The
court found for the patient’s family, holding that if the correct procedure had been performed, she might have
improved. Id. at 511. See also Keith, supra note 20, at 765; Mangan, supra note 20, at 278-88 (stating that this case
has the recognition as being the first case to “expressly” authorize the use of the doctrine).
27

Hamil v. Bashline, 392 A.2d 1280 (Pa. 1980). Hamil was admitted to the hospital experiencing chest pains, but
after he was admitted the physician left. Id. at 1282. Subsequently, he was transferred to another hospital where he
died. Id. The court found that once it is shown that the acts of the physician increased the risk of harm to the
patient, the case could go to the jury. Id. at 1288. The testimony established evidence that Hamil had a 75-percent
chance of survival if treated property. Id at 1283. See also Beth Clemens Boggs, Lost Chance of Survival Doctrine:
Should The Courts Ever Tinker With Chance?, 16 S. ILL. U. L.J. 421, 433 (1992).
28

Herskovits v. Group Health Coop., 664 P.2d 474 (Wash. 1983). Decedent was treated at the hospital with cough
medicine but was diagnosed one year later with cancer, which ultimately killed him. Id. at 475. The court held that
the fourteen percent reduction in his chance of survival was enough to allow the jury to determine whether the
physician’s negligent diagnosis was the proximate cause of death. Id. at 476-77.
29

Mangan, supra note 20, at 288.

30

However, this doctrine has been the target of extremely harsh criticism. McKellips v. Saint Francis Hosp., Inc.,
741 P.2d 467, 474 (Okla. 1987). The court noted:
Health care providers should not have the luxury of having the uncertainty created by their
negligent conduct. To allow otherwise would allow care providers to evade liability for their
negligent actions or inactions in situations in which patients would not necessarily have survived
or recovered, but still would have a significant chance of survival or recovery.
Id. See also King, supra note 25, at 1378 (arguing that a chance of survival has an inherent worth in itself and the
plaintiff should be compensated for the destruction of that chance); Wollen v. DePaul Health Ctr., 828 S.W.2d 681,
683 (Mo. 1992) (arguing that the inflexible rule does not match the “maybe” in today’s society – there is no
practical difference between 49.99 percent and 50.01 percent, except for recovery under the doctrine).
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defendant’s conduct was the proximate cause of his or her injury. 32 The plaintiff must prove that
the patient probably would have recovered or survived if the patient had received proper medical
treatment. 33 If the plaintiff does not satisfy this burden, he is completely barred. However, if he
can satisfy the required proof, he receives an undiscounted award. 34
Courts and commentators cite several reasons why the courts should follow this
approach. First, the emotional nature of human beings drives juries to find for the injured
plaintiff, even if the doctor’s actions are too remote for liability. 35 Second, the courts will alter
or construe the requirements of proximate cause to compensate the plaintiff for his loss. 36
b. The “Substantial” Chance Approach37

31

Boggs, supra note 27, at 425-26. See generally Abille v. United States, 482 F. Supp. 703 (N.D. Cal. 1980)
(applying Alaska law); Murdoch v. Thomas, 404 So.2d 580 (Ala. 1981); Dumas v. Cooney, 1 Cal. Rptr. 2d 584
(1991); Gooding v. University Hosp. Bldg., Inc., 445 So.2d 1015 (Fla. 1984); Blondel v. Hays, 403 S.E.2d 340 (Va.
1991).
32

KEETON ET AL., supra note 3, § 30, at 165.

33

Wells v. Miami Valley Hosp., 631 N.E.2d 642, 647 (Ohio Ct. App. 1993) (holding that the issue of proximate
cause can go to the jury only if there is sufficient evidence to show that with proper diagnosis, treatment and surgery
the patient probably would have survived).
34

King, supra note 25, at 1365.

35

Gooding, 445 So.2d at 1019-20. The court stated:
Lesser standards of proof are understandably attractive in medical malpractice cases, where the
physical well being, and life itself, is the subject of litigation. The strong intuitive sense of
humanity tends to emotionally direct us toward a conclusion that in an action for wrongful death
an injured person should be compensated for the loss of a chance for survival, regardless of its
remoteness. However, we have trepidations that such a rule would be so loose it would produce
more injustice than justice.
Id. at 1020.
36

Keith, supra note 20, at 790. (expressing concern that this doctrine will produce substantial amounts of injustice).

37

See generally Borkowski v. Sacheti, 686 A.2d 120 (Conn. 1996); Cahoon v. Cummings, 715 N.E.2d 1 (Ind. Ct.
App. 1999) opinion vacated by, Cahoon v. Cummings, 734 N.E.2d 535 (Ind. 2000); Dickey ex rel. Dickey v.
Daugherty, 917 P.2d 889 (Kan. 1996); Delaney v. Kade, 873 P.2d 175 (Kan. 1994); Perez v. Las Vegas Med. Ctr.,
805 P.2d 589 (Nev. 1991); Jorgensen v. Vener, 613 N.W.2d 50 (S.D. 2000) opinion to be republished, 616 N.W.2d
366 (S.D. 2000).
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The “substantial” chance doctrine allows for recovery when the plaintiff proves that the
defendant’s irresponsible behavior resulted in a substantial loss of a patient’s chance of
survival. 38 Some courts have interpreted “substantial” to mean anything exceeding 50 percent,
while others include anything exceeding five percent. 39
There are a number of criticisms that have precluded courts from applying this doctrine.
First, defining “substantial” is an extremely difficult task. 40 In addition, allowing the jury to
weigh the patient’s chances may produce erratic results and allow full damages even if the
defendant only caused partial harm. 41 Despite all the criticisms, the “substantial” chance
doctrine does not allow the doctor who has “negligently expedited” a patient’s demise to be
immune from liability. 42
c. Restatement (Second) of Torts Approach43
Section 323(a)44 of the Restatement of Torts, [hereinafter “the Restatement”] creates
liability if one person’s actions increase the risk of harm to another person. 45 Courts that have

38

Mangan, supra note 20, at 307. See also Keith, supra note 20, at 792-93 (discussing how courts have used both
the term “substantial” and “significant” to refer to this doctrine).
39

Allen E. Shoenberger, Medical Malpractice Injury: Causation and Valuation of the Loss of Chance to Survive, 6
J. LEGAL M ED. 51, 58-59 (1985). But see Perez, 805 P.2d at 592 (stating that “we need to state exactly how high the
chances of survival one must have to be substantial . . . there are limits and we doubt a 10% chance is actionable”).
40

Boggs, supra note 27, at 431.

41

Perdue, supra note 20, at 50.

42

Id. Under this doctrine, the doctor is liable if the plaintiff proves that the doctor’s actions caused a substantial
deprivation in the patient’s chance of survival. See also McKellips v. Saint Francis Hosp. Inc., 741 P.2d 467, 477
(Okla. 1987). The court held that in medical malpractice cases involving the loss of less than a even chance of
recovery or survival where the plaintiff shows that the defendant’s conduct caused a substantial reduction of the
patient’s chance of recovery or survival, irrespective of statistical evidence, the question of proximate cause is for
the jury. Id. If a jury determines that the defendant’s negligence is the proximate cause of the patient’s injury, the
defendant is liable only for those damages proximately caused by his negligence which aggravated a pre-existing
condition. Id. Consequently, a total recovery for all damages attributable to death is not allowed and damages
should be limited in accordance with the prescribed method of valuation. Id.
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adopted the Restatement approach to the loss-of-chance doctrine allow a plaintiff to receive
compensation for the increased risk of harm, not merely for the loss of chance. 46 The application
of the Restatement allows an injured plaintiff to submit his claim to a jury without meeting the
usual burden of proof. 47 The first medical malpractice case to apply this theory was Hamil v.
Bashline. 48 However, this doctrine does not come without criticism; specifically, that this
approach will increase litigation49 because the relaxed causation standard will allow cases to go
to the jury not based upon legal principles, but based on human emotion. 50
d. The “King Approach”51

43

See generally McBride v. United States, 462 F.2d. 72 (9th Cir. 1972); DeBurkarte v. Louvar, 393 N.W.2d 131
(Iowa 1986); Aasheim v. Humberger, 695 P.2d 824 (Mont. 1985); Roberts v. Ohio Permanente Med. Group Inc.,
668 N.E.2d 480 (Ohio 1996); Lay v. Dworman, 732 P.2d 455 (Okla. 1986); McKellips, 741 P.2d at 467.
44

RESTATEMENT (SECOND ) OF TORTS § 323 (1990). § 323 states:
One who undertakes, gratuitously or for consideration, to render services to another which he
should recognize as necessary for the protection of the other’s person or things, is subject to
liability to the other for physical harm resulting from his failure to exercise reasonable care to
perform his undertaking, if: (a) his failure to exercise such care increases the risk of such harm.

45

Boggs, supra note 27, at 432. See also Keith, supra note 20, at 795. This approach only requires the plaintiff to
show: (1) the defendant undertook services to provide protection, (2) the defendant’s tortious conduct increased the
risk of harm, and (3) the defendant’s tortious conduct proximately caused the increase risk of harm. Id.
46

Michelle L. Truckor, The Loss of Chance Doctrine: Legal Recovery for Patients on the Edge of Survival, 24 U.
DAYTON L. RE V. 349, 356 (1999).
47

Id. at 356-57. This method allows a plaintiff to have a jury consider the claim without showing the doctor’s
actions were the proximate cause of the harm. Id. at 356. All that is required of the plaintiff is to show the doctor or
medical practitioner increased the chance of harm to the patient. Id.
48

Hamil v. Bashline, 392 A.2d 1280 (Pa. 1980). The court reasoned that “in order for a doctor not to be completely
insulated because of the uncertainties as to the consequences of his negligent conduct, Section 323(a) acknowledges
this difficulty and permits the issue to go to the jury upon a less than normal threshold of proof. Id. at 1287-88. See
also Herskovits v. Group Health Coop., 664 P.2d 474 (Wash. 1983). The court determined that a loss of 14 percent
allowed the case to be sent to the jury. Id. at 467-77.
49

Boggs, supra note 27, at 435.

50

Truckor, supra note 46, at 364. See also Diane Schmauder, An Analysis of New Jersey’s Increased Risk Doctrine,
25 RUTGERS L.J. 893, 917 (1994).
51

See, e.g., Thompson v. Sun City Community Hosp., 688 P.2d 605 (Ariz. 1985) (adopted in part); Petriello v.
Kalman, 576 A.2d 474 (Conn. 1990); Sanders v. Ghrist, 421 N.W.2d 520 (Iowa 1988); Hastings v. Baton Rouge
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The “King Approach” is the final variation of the loss-of-chance doctrine. 52 This
approach compensates the plaintiff for the loss of a chance to survive. 53 This standard requires no
alteration of the causation requirement, because the plaintiff must prove that the defendant’s
actions proximately caused his loss of chance. 54 Under this doctrine, the defendant is not liable
for injuries for which he may have been liable under more relaxed standards, such as the
substantial chance 55 approach and the Restatement’s increased-risk-of- harm56 doctrine. 57
However, many commentators and medical practitioners believe that the implementation of the
“King approach” will ultimately lead to increased medical costs. 58 Finally, the complexity of

Gen. Hosp., 498 So.2d 713 (La. 1986); Falcon v. Memorial Hosp., 462 N.W.2d 44 (Mich. 1990), judgement rev’d in
part, 467 N.W. 2d 25 (Mich. 1991).
52

King, supra note 25, at 1353.

53

Id. at 1382. Professor King uses the example of a patient who suffered a heart attack and died, after the doctor
misdiagnosed the condition. Id. Even with the correct treatment, the patient only had a 40-percent chance of
survivial. Id. Under this species of the theory, the defendant should be liable for the 40-percent loss of chance. Id.
The compensation should be forty percent of what the value of the victim’s life. Id.
54

Id. at 1395. See also Lambie v. Schneider, 713 N.E.2d 603 (Ill. App. Ct. 1999), appeal denied, 720 N.E.2d 1094
(Ill. 1999); Boggs, supra note 27, at 438; King, supra note 25, at 1360. The method of valuation measures the
compensable chance as the “percentage probability” by which the tortious actions of the defendant medical
practitioner eliminated the chance of achieving a more favorable outcome. Id. at 1382. There are guidelines that the
trier of fact must follow in making this determination. Id. The award is based upon the value of the patient’s life
reduced in proportion to the lost chance. Id. Professor King lists several factors that determine the value of the
patient’s life. Id. These factors include: (1) age; (2) health; and (3) earning potential. Id. Professor King labels this
“probability formula” as predictable and finely tuned. Id. He premised the valuation and compensation formula on
the fact that the defendant should be liable only to the extent that (1) he tortiously contributed to the harm by
allowing a preexisting condition to progress; (2) aggravated its harmful effects; or (3) caused harm in excess of that
which is solely attributed to the preexisting conditions. Id. The defendant is not liable for the entire loss because the
preexisting condition has reduced some chance of the patient’s survival. King, supra note 25, at 1360.
55

See supra note 37 (cases).

56

See supra note 43 (cases).

57

Ellen M. Foran, Medical Malpractice: A Lost Chance Is a Compensable Interest, 12 BRIDGEPORT L. REV. 471,
495-96 (1992). In fact, the King analysis does not foreclose the recovery of the injured patient when his chance of
survival is less than 50 percent. Id.
58

Boggs, supra note 27, at 438.
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King’s mathematical formula can lead to confusion and an additional burden upon the finder of
fact. 59
C. History of Loss of Chance in Ohio
In Cooper v. Sisters of Charity of Cincinnati, Inc., 60 the Ohio Supreme Court rejected the
loss-of-chance theory and applied the traditional causation requirements, which require the
plaintiff to show that the defendant’s conduct was the proximate cause of the plaintiff’s injury. 61
The Court was primarily concerned with the possibility that the jury might be persuaded by
human emotion and not by the facts. 62
However, in 1996, the Ohio Supreme Court decided Roberts v. Ohio Permanente
Medical Group, Inc. 63 The Court expressed its great displeasure at the harsh rule laid down in
Cooper, and completely changed the foundation of this doctrine as it would apply in Ohio by
adhering to the increased-risk-of- harm theory set out in the Restatement. 64

59

Dionne R. Carney, Smith v. State of Louisiana, Department of Health and Hospitals : Loss of Chance of Survival:
The Valuation Debate, 58 LA. L. RE V. 339, 359-60 (1997). Carney stated that one problem with this approach and
its percentage probability valuation method is that it involves the use of an inflexible formula. Id. at 360. She states
that “the damages awarded to the plaintiff are based on imprecise percentage chance estimates applied to general
damages that never occurred, and both of which cannot be calculated with mathematical precision. When these two
imprecise figures are multiplied, the uncertainty progresses geometrically.” Id.
60

Cooper v. Sisters of Charity of Cincinnati, Inc., 272 N.E.2d 97 (Ohio 1971), overruled by Roberts v. Ohio
Permanente Med. Group, Inc., 668 N.E.2d 480 (Ohio 1996).
61

Id. at 103. “The jury may consider the issue of proximate cause only if there is sufficient evidence that with
proper treatment . . . the patient probably would have survived.” Id.
62

Id. The court stated that “while lesser standards of proof are mo re desirable in medical malpractice cases . . .
humanity emotionally directs us to the conclusion that . . . an injured person should be compensated for any loss of
chance of survival regardless of its remoteness.” Id.
63

Roberts v. Ohio Permanente Med. Group, Inc., 668 N.E.2d 480 (Ohio 1996). The executor of the decedent’s
estate filed a wrongful death claim against the defendants based upon the theory of negligence for allowing a 17month delay in diagnosing decedent’s lung cancer. Id. at 481. The court discarded the harsh formalistic rule of
Cooper and adopted the “increased harm” theory. Id. at 483-84. The court found for the plaintiff, holding that to
allow the case to be heard by the jury, the plaintiff must show that the negligent act of the doctor increased the risk
of harm to the plaintiff. Id. at 484.
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III. STATEMENT OF THE CASE
A. Statement of Facts
In late 1989, doctors diagnosed Georgia Gibson McMullen (the decedent) with acute
myelogenous leukemia. 65 Two months after receiving an allogenic bone marrow transplant,
McMullen was readmitted to the Ohio State University Hospital (OSUH) because of an infection
and high fever. 66 After doctors consulted with Ms. McMullen, she elected to have an
endotracheal tube inserted and was placed on a ventilator.

67

The nurse on duty testified that, on

the morning of October 14th , she heard a “squawking” sound coming out of the mask and that
Ms. McMullen’s physical appearance and fa cial expression changed significantly.

68

The nurses

64

Id. at 484. Justice Sweeney expressed his frustration over the Cooper rule and stated that “it has come time to
discard the traditionally harsh view we previously followed and join the majority of court that have adopted the lossof-chance theory.” Id. The court said “in order to maintain an action of the loss than even chance recovery of
survival, the plaintiff must present expert testimony that the health care provider’s act or omission increased the risk
of harm to the plaintiff.” Id. at 481. The court also decided that the best way to compensate for damages is to
follow the proportion approach advocated by King. Id. at 484. But see Truckor, supra note 46, at 367 (stating the
court in Roberts created a hybrid by combining the “increased risk” theory with a proportional damage calculation
method). Truckor goes on to say that Ohio has adopted a “pure loss-of-chance theory because the proportional
damages calculation compensated the plaintiff for the loss chance at recovery, not the increased risk of harm.” Id. at
368.
65

McMullen v. Ohio State Univ. Hosp., 725 N.E.2d 1117, 1119 (Ohio 2000). This type of leukemia is a cancer of
the blood in which too many granulocytes, a type of white blood cells, are produced in the bone marrow. Methodist
Health Care System, Houston, Texas, Acute Myelogenous Leukemia (visited June 18, 2000)
http://www.methodisthealth.com/cancer/leukemia/acumye.htm. It affects the young blood cells (blasts) that develop
into white blood cells called granulocytes. Id.
66

Brief for Appellant at 1, McMullen v. Ohio State Univ. Hosp., 725 N.E. 2d 1117 (Ohio 2000) (No. 98-2358). An
allogenic transplant takes the transplanted marrow from a related person.
67

McMullen, 725 N.E.2d at 1119. The hospital administered an 80-percent concentration of oxygen through an
oxygen mask; however, she continued to experience shortness of breath. Id.
68

Id. Nurse Tina DeRossa was assigned the duty of watching over Ms. McMullen during the period from late night
October 13th to early morning October 14th. Brief for Appellant at 1, McMullen (No. 98-2358). During this time,
DeRossa called for additional help while Ms. McMullen’s oxygen level dropped to a critical level. McMullen, 725
N.E.2d at 1119. With the help of expert testimony, the court found that an oxygen saturation level of 29 percent is
inconsistent with life. Id. This low level caused irreversible damage to her brains, heart and lungs. Id
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disconnected the ventilator and used an ambu-bag to force 100-percent concentration of oxygen
through her endotracheal tube.

69

Because Ms. McMullen was cyanotic and dyspneic, 70 the nurses decided to remove the
endotracheal tube and utilize a “stat page” for assistance instead of a “Code Blue,” which is used
for life-threatening situations. 71 Dr. Wilmer and Dr. Campbell, resident physicians, responded to
the “stat page” and prepared to reintubate McMullen. 72 It took the doctors several attempts, and
over 20 minutes to successfully reintubate her. 73 Although her heartbeat improved, the delay in
reinitubating Ms. McMullen rendered her irreversibly comatose. She passed away on October
21, 1990.74
B. Procedural History
On October 20, 1992, the plaintiffs filed a wrongful death action against OSU Hospital
on behalf of the estate of Georgia McMullen. 75 After hearing expert testimony from both sides

69

Id.

70

Id. W EBSTER’S INTERNATIONAL DICTIONARY 563 (3d ed. 1986). A person is cyanotic when there is a dusky or
purplish discoloration of her skin due to a deficient oxygen level in the blood, either locally or systemically.
W EBSTER’S INTERNATIONAL DICTIONARY 712 (3d ed. 1986). A person is dyspneic when she experiences labored
breathing, or has difficulty in breathing.
71

McMullen v. Ohio State Univ. Hosp., 725 N.E.2d 1117, 1119 (Ohio 2000).

72

Id.

73

McMullen v. Ohio State Univ. Hosp., No. 97API10-1301, 1998 WL 655023, at *1 (Ohio Ct. App. Sept. 22, 1998),
rev’d, 725 N.E.2d 1117 (Ohio 2000). Dr. Wilmer made at least one attempt and Dr. Campbell made at least five
unsuccessful attempts to reintubate McMullen. McMullen, 725 N.E.2d at 1119. Dr. Penn testified that due to the
failure to timely reintubate McMullen, her direct cause of death was a combination of diffuse alveolar damage of the
lungs associated with a mass of Ischemic damage to the heart, pancreas, adrenals, brain and the gastrointestinal tract.
Id. at 1120.
74

McMullen, 1998 WL 665032, at *1.

75

McMullen, 725 N.E.2d at 1117. The Court of Claims concluded that the nurses and doctors were negligent in both
the removal of the endotracheal tube and the attempted reintubation of McMullen. Id. at 1119. The court also found
that the anesthesiologist was negligent when it took six or more attempts to reintubate McMullen. Id.
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regarding proximate cause, 76 the Court of Claims found that the plaintiff had proven $1,000,000
in damages. 77
The Court applied the mathematical formula used in Roberts and determined that the
decedent had a 25-percent chance of survival. 78 After the defendant’s actions, her chance of
survival was zero percent. 79 The court awarded the plaintiff $250,000, and both parties
appealed. 80
The Court of Appeals agreed that the loss-of-chance doctrine was applicable in this case,
but remanded the case to the Court of Claims to determine the actual lost chance of survival. 81
Plaintiff subsequently filed a Notice of Appeal, which the Supreme Court of Ohio granted. 82

76

Id. at 1120. Plaintiff’s experts concluded that the direct cause of death was the hypoxic episode, which resulted in
diffuse alveolar damage to her lungs. Id. The defendant’s expert opined that McMullen would have died within
thirty days notwithstanding the incident. Id.
77

Id.

78

McMullen v. Ohio State Univ. Hosp., 725 N.E.2d 1117, 1120 (Ohio 2000).

79

Id.

80

Roberts v. Ohio Permanente Med. Group, Inc., 668 N.E.2d 480, 484-85 (Ohio 1996). The court stated that the
amount of damages recoverable by a plaintiff in a loss-of-chance case equals the total sum of damages for the
underlying in jury or death assessed from the date of the negligent act or omission multiplied by the percentage of
the lost chance. Id. at 484. The Court of Claims found that the plaintiff’s damages were $1,000,000 and since there
was a 25-percent chance of survival, Ms. McMullen was entitled to $250,000. McMullen v. Ohio State Univ. Hosp.,
No. 97API10-1301, 1998 WL 655023, at *3 (Ohio Ct. App. Sept 22, 1998). The plaintiff’s assignment of error was
that the “trial court erred in applying the law regarding the loss of chance of survival as set forth by the Supreme
Court in Roberts to the present case after the defendant’s negligence was the direct and proximate cause of
McMullen’s death.” Id. at *3. The majority of the defendant’s assignments of errors are outside the scope of this
article.
81

Id. at *7. The court stated “given the lack of evidence to support a judgment that decedent lost a 25-percent
chance of survival, the judgment must be reversed as against the manifest weight of the evidence. C.E. Morris v.
Foley Const. Co., 376 N.E.2d 578, 579 (Ohio 1978) (holding that the rule in Ohio is that judgments supported by
some kind of credible evidence going to all essential elements of the case will not be reversed by a reviewing court
as being against the “manifest weight of the evidence”). But see McMullen, 1998 WL 655023, at *16 (Bryant, J.,
dissenting) (arguing that this case should be reversed on the grounds that it is a case of traditional medical
malpractice).
82

McMullen, 725 N.E.2d at 1121.
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C. Ohio Supreme Court Decision
The Court, in an opinion written by Justice Resnick, held that the loss-of-chance doctrine
does not apply when there is a finding of a direct causal connection between the negligent act
and the patient’s death. 83 The Court found that the negligence of the defendant did not combine
with any pre-existing harm, because this negligence was the sole cause of the decedent’s harm. 84
The Court concluded, agreeing with Justice Bryant, 85 that this case is a straightforward medical
malpractice case because the actions of the hospital employees did not hasten or aggravate a preexisting condition. 86
In a strong dissenting opinion, Chief Justice Moyer emphasized that this decision will
subject doctors to full damages despite the fact that there was only a 25 percent chance of
survival. 87 In his opinion, this case is analogous to a typical loss-of-chance claim because
McMullen’s disease had progressed to a level where her respiratory system did not function
naturally. 88 The Chief Justice gave no reason for distinguishing this case from a case that
applied the Roberts analysis. In the case at bar, there was a pre-existing condition affecting Ms.

83

Id. at 1123. The court reasoned that the loss-of-chance doctrine does not apply to a person who could ultimately
satisfy the causation requirement. Id. at 1122.
84

Id. at 1124. See also Anderson v. Picciotti, 676 A.2d 127 (N.J. 1996) (stating that the defendant was not entitled
to a loss-of-chance instruction absent sufficient evidence proving that the defendant’s negligent conduct combined
with a pre -existing condition to cause the harm to the patient).
85

McMullen, 1998 WL 655023, at *15 (Bryant, J., dissenting).

86

McMullen v. Ohio State Univ. Hosp., 725 N.E.2d 1117, 1125 (Ohio 2000).

87

Id. at 1129 (Moyer, C.J., dissenting). Chief Justice Moyer stated several reasons why the lower court correctly
determined this was a loss-of-chance case. Id. at 1130. First, the trial court never stated that the removal of the tube
or the failure to reintubate was the cause of death. Id. Second, the trial court found that an oxygen level of 69
percent was inconsistent with life, not the negligence of the doctors. Id.
88

Id.
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McMullen and the Court of Claims found it three times as likely that Ms. McMullen would not
have recovered, even with correct medical treatment. 89
IV. ANALYSIS
A. The Ohio Supreme Court’s Application of Traditional Medical Malpractice Requirements
Ohio has adhered to the same requirements established as common law many years ago.90
The concept of allowing an injured party to recover an unmitigated damage award flowing from
her injuries, if she can show that the defendant proximately caused the harm, has a long history
of acceptance in our court system. 91
B. Present Decision by the Ohio Supreme Court
Based upon substantive legal principles and notions of public policy, this decision is
consistent with the decisions of earlier courts. 92 First, the Court acknowledged the existence of
the loss-of-chance doctrine, but refused to apply it to these particular circumstances. 93 The Court

89

Id. at 1129. See also Joseph H. King Jr., Reduction of Likelihood: Reformulation and Other Retrofitting of the
Loss-of-Chance Doctrine, 28 U. M EM. L. REV. 491, 495 (1998). Professor King listed a number of factors to
determine whether lost chance principles or traditional causation principles apply. Id. King suggested that the lossof-chance doctrine should apply when one of the four is present. Id. Chief Justice Moyer stated in his opinion that
McMullen possessed the attributes of 2(b): “the only question was how to reflect the presence of a preexisting
condition in calculating the damages for a materialized injury that the defendant is proven to have probably actively,
tortiously caused.” McMullen, 725 N.E.2d at 1129.
90

See supra note 7. See also Littleton v. Good Samaritan Hosp. & Health Ctr., 529 N.E.2d 449, 454 (Ohio 1988)
(listing the requirements the plaintiff must prove). The traditional common law rule has resulted in many cases of
an uncompensated but deserving plaintiff. Id.; Perdue, supra note 20, at 43-44. Perdue illustrates a number of ways
that a plaintiff may fail to establish causation. Id. First, the required expert may not want to testify in terms of
“reasonable medical certainty.” Id. Second, there is also a theory referred to as the “conspiracy of silence.” Id.
Here the expert refuses to testify against other doctors he is associated with or practices in the same field. Id. Third,
the court may just reject the plaintiff offering of proof that the actions of the defendant were indeed the proximate
cause of the harm, and accept that defendant’s contention that he only “eliminated” a chance of survival. Id. at 44
n.41. However, causation works to the advantage of the plaintiff in many other cases. Id. at 45. If the injured
plaintiff can satisfy the preponderance of the evidence burden with respect to causation, he receives an award, which
cannot be discounted by the percentage of his chance of survival. Id.
91

Robert S. Bruer, Loss of Chance As A Cause of Action in Medical Malpractice Cases, 59 M O. L. REV. 969, 986
(1994).
92

See infra notes 106-17 and accompanying text.
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relied upon the decision in Anderson v. Picciotti, 94 which stated that, in order for a defendant “to
benefit from the loss-of-chance doctrine, he must prove that the plaintiff’s injury was caused by
concurrent causes and one of which must be unrelated to the defendant’s negligence.”95
In this case, there was only one cause of death: the hypoxic state brought on by the
doctors and the nurses who attempted to reintubate Ms. McMullen. 96 The failure to reintubate
caused her oxygen level to drop to 29 percent, which expert testimony on both sides concluded
was “inconsistent with life.”97 The hospital admitted Ms. McMullen originally to receive a bone
marrow transplant and, subsequent to her death, the doctors found that no malignancy remained
in her body. 98 In light of this information, this case differs from the cases controlled by
Roberts. 99 Ms. McMullen died from a single tortious event that was under the defendant’s
control. 100 It would be unconscionable to apply the award-reduction rule from Roberts to a case
in which the incompetence or the inability of the presiding doctor injured the patient.

93

McMullen v. Ohio State Univ. Hosp., 725 N.E.2d 1117, 1123 (Ohio 2000). However, the court’s language
indicated that the plaintiff should not be involuntarily confined within the limits of an increased risk or loss-ofchance theory where her efforts to prove a direct causal relationship between the defendant’s negligence and the
decedent’s death are successful. Id.
94

Anderson v. Picciotti, 676 A.2d 127, 134 (N.J. 1996).

95

McMullen, 725 N.E.2d at 1124; Anderson, 676 A.2d. at 134.

96

McMullen, 725 N.E.2d at 1124-25. Justice Resnick stated “. . . that the negligence of the hospital did not combine
with a condition that McMullen was already experiencing. Id. The actions of the employees of the hospital caused
the direct harm . . . they made ‘it certain that she would not survive.’” Id. Brief for Appellant at 10, McMullen (No.
98-2358). The postmortem examination discovered that there was no malignancy present in the bone marrow. Id.
97

McMullen v. Ohio State Univ. Hosp., No. 97API10-1301, 1998 WL 655023, at *7 (Ohio Ct. App. Sept. 22, 1998),
rev’d, 725 N.E.2d 1117 (Ohio 2000). Dr. Meyer’s report conluded that the doctor’s delay in reinitubating her
caused the deprivation of oxygen to McMullen. Id. An oxygen saturation of this level caused irreversible damages
to her heart, lungs and brain. Id. The only thing inconsistent with life is death. Id.
98

Amicus Curiae Brief on Behalf of Trial Lawyers of America for Appellant at i, McMullen (No. 98-2358).

99

See supra notes 63-64.

100

McMullen v. Ohio State Univ. Hosp., 725 N.E.2d 1117, 1124-25 (Ohio 2000).
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Second, both of the dissenting justices in McMullen, as well as the majority in the
appellate court decision, misconstrued the limited holding in Roberts.101 Roberts plainly states
that although the court is adopting the loss-of-chance doctrine, it does not alter traditional
causation principles and it does not overrule Cooper. 102
The decisions in numerous cases in Ohio and in other jurisdictions lend credence to the
aforementioned analysis and conclusion. 103 These cases demonstrate certain factual
situations in which Cooper was applied and in which the causation requirement was satisfied. 104
There are also several cases in which the plaintiff failed to meet his burden of proof. 105
For example, in Ulmer v. Ackerman,106 which is factually similar to McMullen, the Court
stated that when a “qualified expert testifies that the departure from the standard of care causes

101

Roberts v. Ohio Permanente Med. Group, Inc., 668 N.E.2d 480, 485 (Ohio 1996).

102

Id. The court stated that:
We stress that our decision today is limited in its scope and does not alter traditional principles of
causation in other areas of the law. Instead of overruling Cooper, we join the majority of the states
that have adopted the loss of chance theory and recognize the importance of compensating
plaintiffs in an amount consistent . . . with acts or omissions.

Id.
103

See infra notes 106, 109, 114 and accompanying text. See also Dixon v. Taylor, 431 S.E.2d 778 (N.C. Ct. App.
1993). Mrs. Dixon arrived at the hospital and was put under the care of Dr. Sykes. Id. at 779. Her condition
worsened to a point where a decision was made to intubate her to provide respiratory support. Id. Dr. Taylor
decided to slowly take Dixon off the tube, but before they could do so Dixon had to be in the proper position in her
bed. Id. at 780. Blackham, a respiratory therapist, removed the tube; however, Dixon was not breathing properly.
Id. It was decided to reintubate her, but Blackham could not get the tube back into her. Id. Successful reintubation
was accomplished eighteen minutes later, but Dixon never regained consciousness. Id. A neurological evaluation
indicated that Dixon was brain dead due to suffocation. Id. The court held that the trial court was correct in denying
directed verdicts for the defendants because reasonable minds “could accept from the testimony at trial that the
hospital’s breach of duty was a cause of Dixon’s death . . . and the failure to stock the cart with proper instruments
for reintubation was a proximate cause of death.” Id. at 782.
104

See infra notes 106, 109 and accompanying text.

105

See infra notes 114-16 and accompanying text.

106

Ulmer v. Ackerman, 621 N.E.2d 1315 (Ohio Ct. App. 1993). While Ulmer was in surgery, an anesthesiologist
administered anesthesia using an endotracheal tube. Id. He was taken from surgery to the recovery room where the
endotracheal tube was still in place. Id. at 1317-18. The patient’s breathing was recorded and found choppy,
requiring assistance to continue breathing. Id. at 1318. The doctor subsequently removed the tube. Id. The
plaintiff brought a medical malpractice claim based upon the allegation that the anesthesiologist prematurely
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the death of the patient . . . it imports that the patient would have survived absent the
departure.”107 Ms. McMullen’s medical experts testified that the cause of her death was the
hypoxic condition that resulted from the doctors’ failure to reintubate her in a timely manner. 108
In another case, Safranic v. Belamy,109 the hospital admitted the decedent because she
was experiencing breathing difficulties. 110 The Court held that, although the plaintiff must
produce evidence that the defendant’s act probably caused the injury, an injured plaintiff does
not need to show that the negligence resulted in a greater than 50-percent loss of chance for
survival. 111 The Court only required that an expert testify to a reasonable degree of medical
certainty that the defendant’s actions caused the injury. 112 McMullen is analogous to Safranic
because the court determined that the doctor’s negligence caused a 25-percent reduction in Ms.
McMullen’s chance of survival. 113

removed the tube. Id. at 1315. The plaintiff’s expert, Doctor de Rosayro, testified that the tube was removed
prematurely because Ulmer was not shown to be breathing adequately on his own. Id. The court stated where “no
other alternative save decedent’s death may be inferred from the defendant’s conduct according to expert medical
testimony, no occasion arose for disproof of other alternatives. Id. at 1319. The court found that Cooper did not
require a plaintiff to show that the decedent would have survived but for the negligence of the anesthesiologist. Id.
The court noted “where no other alternative save decedent’s death may be inferred from the defendant’s conduct
according to expert medical testimony, no occasion arose for disproof of other alternatives.” Id.
107

Id. The court went on to say that no more than this is required for a plaintiff to establish proximate cause in a
prima facie medical malpractice case. Id.
108

McMullen v. Ohio State Univ. Hosp., No. 97API10-1301, 1998 WL 655023, at *3 (Ohio Ct. App. Sept. 22,
1998), rev’d, 725 N.E.2d 1117 (Ohio 2000).
109

Safranic v. Belamy, 623 N.E.2d 611 (Ohio Ct. App. 1993).

110

Id. Dr. Brower, the plaintiff’s expert, testified that the staff of the hospital did not exercise the required standard
of care. Id. The basis of the plaintiff’s medical malpractice claim was the hospital’s failure to detect her myocardial
infarction and failing to properly monitor her after removal from the ventilator. Id.
111

Id. at 613.

112

Id.

113

See supra notes 80-81. The Court of Claims took all of the expert’s testimony in the aggregate and concluded
that McMullen had less than a 50-percent chance of survival, and more specifically, a 25-percent chance of survival.
McMullen, 1998 WL 655023, at *7.
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However, in Moore v. University of Cincinnati Hospital, the plaintiff was unable to
satisfy the Cooper standard. 114 In this case, the decedent had a comparatively minor form of
sickle-cell anemia. 115 Dr. Castro, the plaintiff’s expert, testified that a transfusion would have
allowed the decedent a chance to survive; however, the expert could not say whether it was more
probable than not that the patient would have survived. 116
Examining all of these cases demonstrates that, if the plaintiff can prove that the
defendant’s act caused the injury to the patient by a reasonable degree of probability, the plaintiff
can recover. 117 This also shows that the loss-of-chance claim, as the one upheld in Roberts, is
applicable only when the plaintiff cannot meet her burden of proof. 118 The rationale set forth in
McMullen is neither a novel approach, nor one that branches off from the accepted principles of
substantive law. 119 The McMullen Court maintained the traditional requirements of tort law by
imposing a strict standard upon the plaintiff before it would find the defendant liable.
C. Public Policy Justifications

114

Moore v. University of Cincinnati Hosp., 639 N.E.2d 798 (Ohio Ct. App. 1994).

115

Id. at 798. The patient’s condition improved when she was admitted to the hospital but she later passed away due
to a sickle -cell “crisis,” complicated by a bone marrow infection. Id.
116

Id. at 800. In fact, only a third of Castro’s patients who received blood transfusions and who suffered from the
same condition as the decedent actually survived. Id.
117

KEETON ET AL., supra note 3, § 41, at 269.

118

See supra notes 106, 109. It is well settled that the loss-of-chance doctrine is an exception to the common law
medical malpractice rule. This doctrine applies when the plaintiff cannot satisfy his standard of proof with respect
to causation or any of the other elements of the cause of action. See Safranic v. Belany, 623 N.E. 2d 611 (Ohio Ct.
App. 1993). Cases evince that when the plaintiff can satisfy the requirement of proximate cause, regardless of the
percentage chance of survival, he or she is entitled to full compensation. Id. at 613.
119

See supra note 7. McMullen satisfied each of the required elements. McMullen v. Ohio State Univ. Hosp., 725
N.E.2d 1117, 1127 (Ohio 2000). A duty was established between the doctor and McMullen, and the court accepted
expert testimony that the doctor breached that standard of care. Id. McMullen satisfied the “but-for” causation as
well as the proximate cause requirement. Id. The defendant’s actions were established as the direct cause of her
demise. See also Cavico & Cavico, supra note 7, at 599 (allowing damages that compensate the plaintiff in whole
or in part).
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The decision in McMullen solidifies various public policy concerns related to medical
malpractice cases. 120 Ohio cases, especially those that stem from Roberts and the “increased
harm” doctrine, should not be extended in scope to allow a diminution in the award to an
individual who is harmed by the negligent acts of the defendant. 121 If the court had allowed a
reduction in the award because the patient had a less than an even chance of survival, the court in
essence would have allowed future patients to become “wild game” and would have allowed for
“open season” for other doctors in similar situations. 122
Second, an injured party should not be restricted in deciding what claims are permissible
to assert when all the elements of the underlying tort are satisfied. 123 By allowing Roberts to
govern and forcing Ms. McMullen to use the “loss-of-chance” doctrine, the freedom and
independence of our judicial system disappears, and the defendant ult imately controls the
direction of the litigation.
Finally, the loss-of-chance doctrine is a policy that attempts to benefit both the injured
party and the negligent doctor. 124 Allowing a case to be heard by a jury that, under traditional

120

See infra notes 121-27.

121

See supra notes 106, 109. For centuries, traditional medical malpractice law has required the plaintiff to prove
four demanding elements. Denying the plaintiff full recovery when she satisfies all the requirements of the cause of
action would take hundreds of years of case law and effectively overrule every decision.
122

Cf. Kramer v. Lewisville Mem’l Hosp., 858 S.W.2d 397, 409 (Tex. 1993) (Hightower, J., dis senting). While the
language in the case is advocating the allowance of the loss-of-chance doctrine, its reasoning and theory can be
extended to the situation in McMullen. By allowing doctors to cap their liability in relation to the percentage chance
of survival of the patient it would “declare open season on critically ill or injured persons . . . a segment of society
often least able to exercise independent judgment would be at the mercy of those professionals on whom it must rely
for life saving health care.” Id.
123

McMullen v. Ohio State Univ. Hosp., 725 N.E.2d 1117, 1123 (Ohio 2000). The court emphasized that:
a plaintiff should not, however, be involuntarily confined within the limits of an increased risk or
loss of chance theory where her efforts to prove a causal relationship between the defendant’s
negligence and the decedent’s death are successful. The loss of chance issue must be conditioned
upon a negative finding of proximate cause.
Id. at 1123-24.

http://ideaexchange.uakron.edu/akronlawreview/vol34/iss3/5

22

22

Reuscher: McMullen v. Ohio State University Hospitals

causation principle s, would be barred from jury consideration benefits the plaintiff, and
ultimately results in more plaintiffs receiving just compensation. 125
Conversely, this doctrine benefits the defendant by limiting the patient’s damages to the
extent of the eliminated chance of survival. 126 However, it would be untenable to allow a
defendant to use the loss-of-chance doctrine as a protective shield. Where it is determined that
the actions of the defendant directly caused the patient’s harm, “it does not lie in the defendant’s
mouth to raise conjectures as to the measure of chances that he has put beyond the possibility of
realization.”127
D. Future Effects in Ohio
The decision handed down in McMullen signals a significant victory for injured patients
who have less than a 50-percent chance of survival. 128 Courts can interpret McMullen as giving

124

Mangan, supra note 20, at 324. The loss-of-chance doctrine now allows an opportunity for an injured patient to
recover damages for the result that the defendant has negligently caused, whether it be death or injury. Id. See also
King, supra note 25, at 1360. Professor King argues that this doctrine will benefit the negligent doctor:
Holding the defendant liable for the entire harm without any consideration of the preexisting
condition is . . . unsound . . . . The defendant should be subject to liability only to the extent that
he tortiously contributed to the harm by allowing a preexisting condition to progress or by
aggravating or accelerating its harmful effects.
Id. at 1359-60.
125

Mangan, supra note 20, at 285. The unfairness of denying recovery to an injured patient was the catalyst for the
evolution of the loss-of-chance doctrine. See Howard Ross Feldman, Chances as Protected Interests: Recovery for
the Loss of A Chance and Increased Risk , 17 U. BALT . L. REV. 139, 148 (1987). Feldman argues that because tort
law allows for recovery for any protected interest that the loss of a chance of survival should be classified in the
same manner. Id.
126

King, supra note 25, at 1360. Although the defendant caused part of the injury, it is inequitable and patently
unfair to allow full recovery against the defendant when the normal course of human existence has invaded the
patient’s body and permitted the present disease to spread throughout the patient’s body. Id. See also supra note
124.
127

Hicks v. United States, 368 F.2d 626 (4th Cir. 1966).

128

McMullen v. Ohio State Univ. Hosp., No. 97API10-1301, 1998 WL 655023, at *7 (Ohio Ct. App. Sept. 22,
1998), rev’d, 725 N.E.2d 1117 (Ohio 2000). The Court of Claims concluded that the decedent had less than a 50percent chance of surviving before the actions of the defendant. Id. Dr. Carl Meyer testified, on behalf of the
plaintiff that McMullen had up to a 60-percent chance of survival. Id. However, Dr. Neena Kapoor testified that
McMullen had less than a 50-percent chance of survival. Id. Dr. Skeel testified that McMullen had less than a 20percent chance of survival, whereas Dr. Crawford testified that McMullen had a zero percent chance of survival. Id.
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notice or warning to all doctors because plaintiffs may be able to recover an appropriate amount
of damages for their injuries, despite a low percentage of survival. 129 Before McMullen,
however, a patient could not recover damages without some type of reduction if he or she had
less than a 51-percent chance of survival. 130 Now, there is a significant likelihood that patients
will prevail under similar circumstances.
However, this decisio n will ultimately harm the defendant medical practitioner for
several reasons. 131 First, there will be not only a vast expansion of liability, but also added
societal costs, which will raise both doctors’ fees and medical insurance premiums for most
people. 132 Second, by allowing this new theory, the courtroom doors are open to engulf the
masses. 133 Lastly, some commentators have expressed concern that the increase in litigation may
prevent numerous inventions and advancements within the medical field. 134

The court stated that it is clear from the Court of Claims’s discussion of causation that the court chose not to adopt
Dr. Meyer’s testimony that the decedent had a better than 50-percent chance of surviving at the time of the
University Hospital’s breach of its duty of care. Id. at *7. On a general level, this decision allows the traditional
requirements of proximate cause to remain in effect.
129

Ellis, supra note 20, at 372. Doctors should now be aware that they will be legally and “perhaps” morally
responsible for the entire award amount if their negligent act is found to be the proximate cause of the patient’s
injury.
130

See supra notes 32-34. If the chance of survival was below 51 percent, the patient could not mathematically
show it was more probable than not that the defendant caused the resulting injury.
131

See infra notes 132-34 and accompanying text.

132

Cf. Boggs, supra note 27, at 439 (claiming that people in the medical field fear that insurance premiums will rise
significantly). But see Feldman, supra note 125, at 150. (arguing that insurance costs will actually decrease because
of the added quality and efficiency within the medical field (the reasoning and policy concerns listed were originally
listed as a criticism of the loss-of-chance doctrine; however, they can be equally and as successfully applied to the
decision in McMullen)).
133

Feldman, supra note 125, at 151. However, this concern is minimized by two factors: (1) The court system can
weed out frivolous claims by invoking the use of arbitration or “medical malpractice tribunals” and, (2) the courts
may refuse to allow claims praying for de minimis relief. Id.
134

Cf. Mangan, supra note 20, at 324. The reasoning listed originally applied to the loss-of-chance doctrine.
However this logic can be extended to the situation in McMullen. Both situations involve “a new theory” and along
with a “new theory” comes an abundance of new claims and increased costs, not only to everyone involved, but also
to the general population as a whole.
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V. CONCLUSION
The Court in McMullen had the opportunity to confront the issue of whether the loss-ofchance doctrine applies to a patient who has less than a 50-percent chance of survival and who
establishes a direct causal connection between the injury and the defendant’s act. 135 The Court
correctly decided that no rational basis exists, either in law or policy, for restricting a patient’s
recovery when the applicable standards of proof are satisfied, and it correctly held that the lossof-chance doctrine is no t applicable in this type of situation. 136
McMullen falls outside the reach of the loss-of-chance doctrine because the plaintiff did
not have a preexisting condition present at the time of the defendant’s wrongful actions. 137 The
defendant made it 100-percent certain that McMullen would not survive. 138 The injured party
must always have an opportunity to recover damages; otherwise, doctors will have more
incentive to engage in sloppy or careless treatment. Doctors should not be able to escape the
appropriate standard of care that all patients deserve, regardless of the patient’s state of health or
illness. Human life is valuable and we must protect it throughout all its stages, from birth to
death. 139 Trying to make this case fit into a loss-of-chance analysis would be like trying to
“force a square peg into a round hole.”140
Christopher Paul Reuscher

135

McMullen v. Ohio State Univ. Hosp., 725 N.E.2d 1117, 1122 (Ohio 2000).

136

Id. at 1124-25.

137

Id. at 1124.

138

Id. at 1125.

139

Mangan, supra note 20, at 325. Mangan expressed a concern that some people may place the value of a person’s
life behind the “possible” added costs that these theories may levy upon a medical practitioner. Id. She stressed that
no matter what the costs incurred by the doctor’s for their conduct, the courts cannot diminish the value of human
life. Id.
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140

Anderson v. Picciotti, 676 A.2d 127, 131 (N.J. 1996).
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